Introduction
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), enacted by Congress in July 2008, was an ambitious piece of housing legislation intended to shore up a slumping housing market and mitigate the effects of the foreclosure crisis, among other things. One of the components of this act is the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (known as NSP1), which authorized the allocation of $4 billion in block grant funds to states and local governments for the acquisition and rehabilitation or demolition of foreclosed and abandoned properties. The funds could also be used to resell the properties and to provide financing for their redevelopment or purchase. Six cities and five suburbs in Cuyahoga County received approximately $48 million.
Seven months after HERA was enacted, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was signed into law, providing an additional $1.93 billion dollars toward neighborhood stabilization activities. This second round of funding for neighborhood stabilization is known as NSP2. Cuyahoga County received $40.8 million. Cleveland received its own allocation of $16 million, half of which was used for demolition.
The intent of this paper is to quantify the extent to which the NSP interventions impacted the stability of the Cuyahoga County housing market above and beyond the impact of homebuyer tax credit incentives included in the same legislation. As a measure of market stability, we use vacancy rates. We examine the vacancy rate of properties that were previously owned by the lender (called real estate owned or REO) in and around areas targeted for NSP dollars. Focusing on REO transactions alone helps us control for heterogeneity in property histories before the first observed transaction in our dataset. We control for a variety of property and neighborhood characteristics, as well as the intended use of the property after the purchase out of REO---as a residence for the buyer ("consumption") or as an investment.
We find that, overall, there is a negligible difference between the vacancy rates of former-REO properties in areas that received funding under the NSP1 and the vacancy rates among matched properties in non-NSP1 areas. The overall impact of NSP2 is also negligible. However, when we control for whether the buyer is buying for consumption or investment, we find an impact. Current vacancy rates of former-REO properties are lower in NSP areas than in non-NSP areas for properties that were purchased for consumption.
Our paper contributes to the growing body of evidence on what happens to a property after it is sold out of REO. Much of the research on the REO market focuses on who is buying and selling the REO properties, the geographic location of REO sales, the selling prices of REO properties, and the time on the market. to be being purchased, who purchased the REOs, and at what price level. He found that investors have purchased an increasing share of REO properties over time and that they were more likely to purchase the lower-valued properties (less than $30,000) in lower-income neighborhoods. Also, in neighborhoods with high levels of low-value REO sales, many of these properties remain vacant and distressed after the purchase.
In another study, Coulton, et al. (2010) Unlike these two studies, our study takes into account differences across geographic locations that may be attributable to the presence of stabilization funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our data and statistical methods. The third section presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Method
We evaluate the impact of the NSP funds on Cuyahoga County's REO market through its effect on the current vacancy status of former-REO properties. We concentrate on REO properties for two reasons. First, as properties that have already gone through foreclosure, REOs are vacant and vulnerable to vandalism and deterioration. An intervention that reduces vacancies would be most valuable to the neighborhoods. Second, REO status provides a common starting point for all the properties. In the absence of a common starting point, the history of the property at the time of the first transaction (the type of seller, vacancy status, the reason for sale) becomes relevant.
REO properties, by contrast, are all owned by a financial institution or government agency and they are all vacant initially.
We identify the areas that were targeted by NSP (1 and 2) funds by examining the NSP plans that were developed by each community. The plans described how and where the community intended to use the funds. In most cases, these areas were particular census tracts within a community, without any reference to specific properties. Within the city of Cleveland, we know exactly which properties were targeted by NSP 1 and which census block those properties are in.
Note that the same census block may have been targeted by either NSP 1 or NSP 2 or it may have been targeted by both. To capture different block types, we split the sample in six categories, depicted in Figure 1 , and analyze each one separately. The first category contains properties that are in a census block targeted by NSP 1, the second contains properties in NSP 2 census blocks, the third has properties that are in NSP 1 but not in NSP 2, the fourth contains properties in NSP 2 but not in 1, the fifth covers properties in census blocks covered by both NSPs, and the sixth is the full sample, that is properties in blocks targeted by NSP 1 or 2.
Information on property sales, including the address and parcel number, the identity of the buyer and the seller and the transaction price, comes from Cuyahoga County auditor records from 2006 until the end of 2010. We include only residential properties-single-family homes, two-family homes, three-family homes, and condominiums. Properties with a sales amount of zero are excluded from the analysis. 1 We group the REO buyers into three categories: investors, nonprofits, and individuals.
REO sellers are either government agencies or banks/mortgage servicers. We cannot distinguish between banks that own the mortgage and those that act as a servicer, but we do distinguish between local banks and nonlocal banks, where localness means having a branch in the county.
We assigned buyers and sellers to the appropriate categories using information in the county record. First, we looked at buyers' and sellers' names. For example, names which included LLC, CO, Group, or Inc. were placed in the investor group. Next, we looked at the number of properties any one person has bought or sold. Individuals who bought or sold more than three properties over a five-year period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) were also placed in the investor group. Individuals who bought or sold fewer than four properties over the five-year period were classified as individuals.
In addition to data on sales transactions, we obtained information about property characteristics from Cuyahoga County auditor records. We also got data on the demographic characteristics of the census blocks, such as income, race, and educational 1 HUD properties with a zero sales prices were found on the County Recorder's site and the transfer amount was entered manually. (For more information on this issue, see Coulton, et al. 2008.) attainment levels of the residents, from the Census Bureau, vacancy data from the United States Postal Service (USPS), and tax delinquency data from the Cuyahoga County treasurer.
Estimation Strategy
We measure the impact of the NSP by comparing the current vacancy status of formerly-REO properties inside and outside the areas that received NSP funds. We focus only on properties sold out of REO after September 2008, when NSP allocations were announced. Other incentives in the same legislation, such as the homebuyer tax credit, applied to all localities while NSP applied only to some. We use this geographic discontinuity to identify the impact of NSP.
We measure the impact using two different methods in order to ensure that our results are robust. First, we run a logistic regression to estimate the probability that a property that was sold out of REO is vacant conditional on buyer type and whether it is in an NSP1 or 2 census block. Also included in this part of the analysis are property and neighborhood characteristics, the time elapsed since the property has been out of REO and whether the seller was a local bank, nonlocal bank or a government agency (VA, FHA, housing GSEs). A complete list of variables is in Table 1 .
Our second method accounts for the fact that real estate markets are highly localized and there may still be unobservable differences that cannot be captured by the covariates we have included in the logistic regression. Table 2 , Panel A shows the REO property characteristics inside and outside the NSP areas. REO properties in NSP areas tend to be older, cheaper, and located in the city of Cleveland and in high-minority areas. To get around this problem of unobserved characteristics, we take all our REO sales in NSP areas and match them with REO sales in non-NSP areas if the properties meet the following conditions:
• The matched property must be sold out of REO within 90 days of the sale of the NSP property
• Both properties must have the same property tax delinquency status.
• The non-NSP properties must be in census blocks within 1 mile of the properties in NSP-targeted census blocks
• Both properties must be purchased out of REO by the same type of buyer Note that as we vary the definition of NSP areas, as in Figure 1 , the excluded properties (properties that received some NSP money but not covered by the particular NSP definition we are interested in) are not available as a match.
We do not always get a unique match with this procedure. Some properties have more than 40 matches that meet these conditions. To find the best match for NSP properties with multiple matches, we calculate the distance between the NSP and the matched non-NSP properties based on total usable area of the property, age of the property and the sale price out of REO. We choose the property with the minimum distance as the best match (procedure described in Bergstralh et al., 1996) . Table 2 , Panel B shows the REO property characteristics inside and outside NSP areas in the matched sample.
Note that the properties are now very similar even in characteristics that were not used in the matching procedure.
After the matching, we compare the average vacancy rates of NSP and non-NSP properties based on the type of buyer and whether the property has been sold again. Table 3 , Panel A presents the results from a univariate analysis. Investors are the most common buyers of REO properties inside and outside NSP 1 areas. Results are similar for NSP 2 (not shown). Nonprofits buy very few properties, but they also have the highest vacancy rates. This is possibly because they purchase properties in the worst markets of the county. Panel B confirms that properties bought by nonprofits have by far the lowest prices, are likely to be older, and are more likely to be in the minoritydominated areas of Cleveland.
Results
Vacancy rates are higher for all types of REO buyers in NSP areas. But once again, this could be because NSP areas are in worse shape than non-NSP areas to begin with. Our logistic regressions take into account the disparities in neighborhood and property characteristics. The results are in Table 4 . Current vacancy rates are still likely to be highest among nonprofit REO buyers, followed by investors, and lowest among individuals. The presence of NSP dollars reduces vacancy rates only if the REO has been purchased by an individual and only in NSP 1 areas. NSP 2 had no impact on vacancies although its more recent history may be the culprit. That is, if NSP dollars are stabilizing the areas they are invested in, one may have to observe these areas for a longer period than we did, to see the impact of greater stability.
The other control variables appear with the expected signs. Lower-priced, smaller, older, tax delinquent properties inside the city in high minority neighborhoods are more likely to be vacant today.
In Table 5 , we compare NSP properties with matched non-NSP properties. While we lose some observations for which there is no match, the property and neighborhood characteristics of the observations that drop out of the sample are not statistically different from those of the observations that remain in the sample (results not shown).
At first glance, the NSP does not seem to have made a difference. Under the All column, vacancy rates inside and outside NSP areas are statistically indistinguishable.
However, once we take the buyer heterogeneity into account, the matched dataset confirms that the vacancy rates decline if a property is purchased out of REO by an individual and only if the property is in an area targeted by NSP 1. These results also show that vacancy rates are higher in NSP 1 areas if the property is purchased by an investor. Table 6 re-examines the data based on other transactions that may have taken place after the REO sale. We do not track transactions beyond the second one. If a property is returned to a bank or government agency, it is assumed to have gone through a new foreclosure. If a sample has fewer than 10 observations, we do not run a difference of means test, as the sample is too small to be meaningful. Because properties acquired by nonprofits and individuals have not gone through foreclosure in the second transaction, those columns are omitted from the tables.
Once again, NSP 1 emerges as the program with a potential impact on vacancies.
Properties that were purchased by investors and remained unsold are more likely to be vacant as of June 2011 if they were in an area targeted by NSP 1. One could speculate that these are properties purchased with the expectation of a recovery in targeted areas, but that expectation has not paid off. Individuals, on the other hand, seem to have We address this issue in Table 7 , albeit imperfectly due to data constraints. With this caveat in mind, Table 7 shows that the vacancy outcomes of REO properties purchased before NSP 1 are indeed different. Properties purchased by investors are significantly less likely to be vacant if they are located in an area that will be targeted by NSP 1. There is no significant impact on REO properties purchased by individuals. We can only speculate that the expectation that the NSP would provide stability may have caused less cautious behavior among investors.
Conclusion
NSP funds were intended to stabilize declining housing markets by assisting communities in dealing with the REO problem. Our analysis shows that ignoring REO buyer heterogeneity can be misleading. NSP 1, in particular, seems to have reduced the incidence of vacancies in targeted areas. However, it may also have caused less cautious behavior among the investors, who are currently sitting on a large number of vacant properties inside NSP 1 areas.
2 The period of time until the vacancy status is observed for a given property will vary based on when the property exits REO. 
